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equal) vacancy costs, there is an unambiguous decrease in economywide unemployment. 
With imperfect intersectoral labor mobility, unemployment in the offshoring sector can rise, 
with an unambiguous unemployment reduction in the non-offshoring sector. Imperfect labor 
mobility can result in a mixed equilibrium in which only some firms in the industry offshore, 
with unemployment in this sector rising. 
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1 Introduction
"O¤shoring" is the sourcing of inputs (goods and services) from foreign countries. When production of these
inputs moves to foreign countries, the fear at home is that jobs will be lost and unemployment will rise. In the
recent past, this has become an important political issue. The remarks by Greg Mankiw, when he was Head
of the Presidents Council of Economic Advisers, that "outsourcing is just a new way of doing international
trade" and is "a good thing" came under sharp attack from prominent politicians from both sides of the aisle.
Recent estimates by Forrester Research of job losses due to o¤shoring equaling a total of 3.3 million white collar
jobs by 2015 and the prediction by Deloitte Research of the outsourcing of 2 million nancial sector jobs by
the year 2009 have drawn a lot of attention from politicians and journalists (Drezner, 2004), even though these
job losses are only a small fraction of the total number unemployed, especially when we take into account the
fact that these losses will be spread over many years.1 Furthermore, statements by IT executives have added
fuel to this re. One such statement was made by an IBM executive who said "[Globalization] means shifting
a lot of jobs, opening a lot of locations in places we had never dreamt of before, going where there is low-cost
labor, low-cost competition, shifting jobs o¤shore", while another statement was made by then Hewlett-Packard
CEO Carly Fiorina in her testimony before Congress that "there is no job that is Americas God-given right
anymore" (Drezner, 2004). The alarming estimates by Bardhan and Kroll (2003) and McKinsey (2005) that 11
percent of our jobs are potentially at risk of being o¤shored have provided anti-o¤shoring politicians with more
ammunition for their position on this issue.
While the relation between o¤shoring and unemployment has been an important issue for politicians, the
media and the public, there has hardly been any careful theoretical analysis of this relationship by economists.
In this paper, in order to study the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral and economywide rates of unemployment,
we construct a two-sector, general-equilibrium model in which unemployment is caused by search frictions a la
Pissarides (2000).2 There is a single factor of production, labor. Firms in one sector, called sector Z; use labor
to produce two inputs which are then assembled into output. The production of one of these inputs (production
input) can be o¤shored, but the other input (headquarter services) must be produced using domestic labor only.
There is another sector, X; that uses only domestic labor to produce its output. Goods Z and X are combined
to produce the consumption good C.
An important result of this paper is that in the presence of perfect intersectoral labor mobility, o¤shoring
leads to wage increases and unemployment reductions in both sectors. The very basic intuition is that there
will be gains from international trade which in this case takes the form of o¤shoring. In a truly single-factor
model, this would mean that this factor of production gains from trade, and that explains why, when labor is
1The average number of gross job losses per week in the US is about 500,000 (Blinder, 2006). Also see Bhagwati, Panagariya
and Srinivasan (2004) on the plausibility and magnitudes of available estimates of the unemployment e¤ects of o¤shoring.
2For a comprehensive survey of the search-theoretic literature on unemployment, see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
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intersectorally perfectly mobile, real wage increases and unemployment declines. When there are impediments
to intersectoral labor mobility, it is possible for unemployment to increase in the Z sector (o¤shoring sector),
however, unemployment in the X sector must decrease. The very basic intuition is that with impediments to
labor mobility, we are e¤ectively moving away from a one-sector model. Thus, even with overall gains from
trade, we can have winners and losers. In the extreme case of labor being totally immobile across sectors, we
truly have a two-factor model, and both factors need not necessarily be winners from o¤shoring (trade). Since
o¤shoring is similar to a technological improvement in the Z sector, the relative supply of Z increases and its
relative price falls as a result (the relative price of X rises). Given that X-sector labor has to win from trade
due to the positive relative price e¤ect in its favor, the only possible loser, if at all there is one, is Z-sector labor.
Moving from the very basic to more detailed intuition, o¤shoring reduces the cost of production and hence
the relative price of good Z, since one of the inputs is o¤shored and is cheaper. The resulting increase in the
relative price of the non-o¤shoring sector X leads to greater job creation and hence reduced unemployment
there. The impact of o¤shoring on Z-sector unemployment depends on the relative strengths of two mutually
opposing forces, namely the decrease in the relative price of Z, and the increase in the productivity of workers
engaged in headquarter activities there (with each such worker now working with more production input, since
it is cheaper). In the presence of perfect labor mobility, the no arbitrage condition ensures that the second e¤ect
dominates and that increases job creation and wages in sector Z. Even though o¤shoring of the production
input destroys the jobs of workers engaged in the production of this input in the Z sector, additional Z-sector
headquarter jobs and X-sector jobs, in excess of the production jobs o¤shored, are created.
In the imperfect labor mobility case, it is possible for the negative relative price e¤ect to dominate the
positive productivity e¤ect in the Z sector. The relative price e¤ect may be weaker or stronger in the imperfect
mobility case (compared to perfect mobility) depending on whether labor is required to move out of the Z sector
or into it. (As explained later in the paper, the direction of movement of labor upon o¤shoring depends on
relative strengths of substitution elasticities in C and Z production.) If labor ends up moving from sector X to
sector Z upon o¤shoring, then the relative price e¤ect is weaker in the case of imperfect mobility compared to
the perfect mobility case, and hence o¤shoring leads to a reduction in the unemployment in the Z sector. In the
more plausible case of labor movement from sector Z to sector X; the negative relative price e¤ect is stronger
with imperfect mobility, and can dominate the positive productivity e¤ect in the Z sector. In this case, we
show the possibility of an incomplete o¤shoring equilibrium (mixed equilibrium) where some rms o¤shore and
others do not. That is, rms are indi¤erent between o¤shoring and not o¤shoring because the domestic cost
of producing the o¤shorable input gets equalized to the cost of the o¤shored input. This, in sector Z, brings
the domestic wage down and the unemployment up relative to autarky. Incomplete o¤shoring makes domestic
labor in the Z sector and the o¤shored input substitutes at the margin. This channel of competitive pressure
on the domestic price of labor in the Z sector goes away when there is complete o¤shoring. In the case of
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complete o¤shoring equilibrium with labor moving from sector Z to sector X; the impact of o¤shoring on the
unemployment and wage in the Z sector becomes ambiguous.
The impact of o¤shoring on aggregate unemployment depends on autarky sectoral unemployment rates,
changes in sectoral unemployment rates, and direction of labor movement consequent upon o¤shoring. In
the case of perfect labor mobility, since the sectoral unemployment rates fall upon o¤shoring, the aggregate
unemployment rate falls as well if labor moves from the high unemployment to the low unemployment sector.
Since labor moves from the o¤shoring sector Z to the non-o¤shoring sector X for most of the parameter space,
aggregate unemployment for those parameter values will fall if the o¤shoring sector has the higher search
cost and consequently higher unemployment rate in autarky. In the imperfect mobility case, since the impact
of o¤shoring on sectoral unemployment rates itself is ambiguous, the impact on aggregate unemployment is
ambiguous as well.
Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical results of Amiti and Wei (2005a, b) for the US and
the UK. They nd no support for the anxiety of massive job losses associated with o¤shore outsourcing
from developed to developing countries.3 Using data on 78 sectors in the UK for the period 1992-2001, they
nd no evidence in support of a negative relationship between employment and outsourcing. In fact, in many
of their specications the relationship is positive. In the US case, they nd a very small, negative e¤ect of
o¤shoring on employment if the economy is decomposed into 450 narrowly dened sectors which disappears
when one looks at more broadly dened 96 sectors. Alongside this result, they also nd a positive relationship
between o¤shoring and productivity. These results are consistent with opposing e¤ects on employment (and
unemployment) created by o¤shoring. In this context, Amiti and Wei (2005a) write: On the one hand, every
job lost is a job lost. On the other hand, rms that have outsourced may become more e¢ cient and expand
employment in other lines of work. If rms relocate their relatively ine¢ cient parts of the production process
to another country, where they can be produced more cheaply, they can expand their output in production for
which they have comparative advantage. These productivity benets can translate into lower prices generating
further demand and hence create more jobs. This job creation e¤ect could in principle o¤set job losses due to
outsourcing.This intuition is consistent with the channels in our model and the reason driving the possibility
of a reduction in sectoral unemployment as a result of o¤shoring.
A discussion of the related theoretical literature is useful here, as it puts in perspective the need for our
analysis. While the relationship between o¤shoring and unemployment has not been analytically studied in
detail before by economists, there is now a vast literature on o¤shoring and outsourcing.4 All the models in that
literature, following the tradition in standard trade theory, assume full employment. In spite of this assumption
3The o¤shoring variable they use, which they call o¤shoring intensity, is dened as the share of imported inputs (material or
service) as a proportion of total nonenergy inputs used by the industry.
4See Helpman (2006) for a review of this literature.
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in the existing literature, it is important to note that our results are similar in spirit to those in an important
recent contribution by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) where they model o¤shoring as "trading in tasks"
and show that even factors of production whose tasks are o¤shored can benet from o¤shoring due to its
productivity enhancing e¤ect. Our paper is also closely related to the fragmentation literature which analyzes
the economic e¤ects of breaking down the production process into di¤erent components, some of which can be
moved abroad.5 In this literature, the possibility of fragmentation leading to the equivalent of technological
improvement in an industry has been shown.6
Also closely related to our work is a recent paper by Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (forthcoming) that
uses a model of job search to study the impact of o¤shoring of high-tech jobs on low and high-skilled workers
wages, and on overall welfare. While their emphasis is on the e¤ect of o¤shoring on relative wages, they also
briey discuss and derive the impact on unemployment in the short-run (when the number of rms is held
xed). Since job prospects for domestic high-skilled workers do not look as promising upon o¤shoring some of
their jobs, they are willing to accept low-skill jobs and in turn increase the competition for such jobs among
workers. Therefore, in the short run, labor-market tightness goes down and unemployment goes up. In the
long-run, however, there is a confounding factor, namely the entry of new rms arising out of an increase in
protability. Our paper di¤ers in many respects as follows: Firstly, the main focus of our paper is on the
impact on unemployment, both at the sectoral level and aggregate levels. Secondly, in our paper, the role of
the extent of intersectoral labor mobility and its interaction with o¤shoring is analyzed. Thirdly, we look at the
general-equilibrium e¤ects on the rest of the economy where o¤shoring does not take place. Finally, we also look
at the role of substitution elasticities in production and consumption in determining the impact of o¤shoring
on unemployment.
Another paper looking at the impact of o¤shoring on the labor market is Karabay and McLaren (2006)
who study the e¤ects of free trade and o¤shore outsourcing on wage volatility and worker welfare in a model
where risk sharing takes place through employment relationships. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004)
also analyze in detail the welfare and wage e¤ects of o¤shoring. Neither Karabay and McLaren, nor Bhagwati,
Panagariya and Srinivasan incorporate unemployment in their analysis.
It is also important to note that there does exist a literature on the relationship between trade and search
induced unemployment (e.g. Davidson and Matusz (2004), Moore and Ranjan (2005), Helpman and Itskhoki
(2007)). The main focus of this literature, as discussed in Davidson and Matusz, has been the role of e¢ ciency
in job search, the rate of job destruction and the rate of job turnover in the determination of comparative
advantage.7 Using an imperfectly competitive set up, Helpman and Itskhoki look at how gains from trade and
5See for instance Arndt (1997), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990 and 2001) and Deardor¤ (2001a and b).
6See for instance Jones and Kierzkowski (2001).
7See also the inuential and well cited paper by Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) for a careful analysis of these relationships
under very general conditions.
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comparative advantage depend on labor market rigidities as captured by search and ring costs and unemploy-
ment benets, and how labor-market policies in a country a¤ect its trading partner. Moore and Ranjan, whose
focus is quite di¤erent from the rest of the literature on trade and search unemployment, show that the impact
of skill-biased technological change on unemployment can be quite di¤erent from that of globalization. None of
these models deals with o¤shoring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model and derive the autarky
equilibrium. In section 3 we describe the o¤shoring equilibria with perfect and imperfect mobility of labor.
Section 4 studies the implications of o¤shoring for wages and unemployment. Section 5 discusses some possible
extensions and robustness issues. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences
All agents share the identical lifetime utility function from consumption given byZ 1
t
exp r(s t) C(s)ds; (1)
where C is consumption, r is the discount rate, and s is a time index. Asset markets are complete. The form
of the utility function implies that the risk-free interest rate, in terms of consumption, equals r.
Each worker has one unit of labor to devote to market activities at every instant of time. The total size of
the workforce is L: The nal consumption good C is produced under CRS using two goods Z and X as inputs
(or equivalently can be considered to be a composite basket of these two goods) as follows:
C = F (Z;X) (2)
We choose the nal consumption good C as numeraire. Let Pz and Px be the prices of Z and X; respectively.
Since the price of C = 1; we get
1 = g(Pz; Px) (3)
where the unit cost function for C, denoted by g; is increasing in both Pz and Px: Therefore, an increase in Pz
is associated with a decrease in Px: Also, (2) implies that the relative demand for Z is given by
Z
X
d
= f(
Pz
Px
); f 0 < 0 (4)
In addition to the utility from consumption, workers also have idiosyncratic preferences for working in a
particular sector which is captured by a per-period utility (or disutility) to individual-j of "ji from being part
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of the labor force in sector-i:8 This can arise from individual-specic preference for the region in which this
industry is located or from the individual specic costs of updating ones human capital that may di¤er across
sectors.9 This is our way of introducing mobility costs in this model. Dene 'j  "jz   "jx: If 'j > 0; then 'j is
the cost to worker j of moving from sector Z to sector X: Similarly, if 'j < 0; it is costly for worker j to move
from sector X to sector Z: 'j = 0; 8j, will capture perfect mobility.
Let us assume that "z and "x are independent of each other and each follows the same extreme value
distribution as in Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008), which is represented by the following special case of
the Gumbel cumulative distribution function:
z("i; i = x; z) = exp

  exp

 "i

  

; "i 2 ( 1;1)
where  = 0:5772 is Eulers constant and  is the scale parameter. The mean of "i is zero and variance is
22=6 (where the constant,   3:14): In this case, ' = "z   "x follows a symmetric distribution with mean
zero and a variance equal to 22=3; and this distribution, denoted by G('); is given by
G(') =
exp('=)
1 + exp('=)
; ' 2 ( 1;1) (5)
As  decreases, the distribution of ' becomes more concentrated around the mean of zero. In the limit, when
! 0; the distribution collapses at ' = 0; which captures our perfect labor mobility case.
2.2 Goods and labor markets
Production of good X is undertaken by perfectly competitive rms. To produce one unit of X a rm needs to
hire one unit of labor.
Z is also produced by competitive rms, but using a slightly more sophisticated technology involving two
separate stages which are then combined. The production function for Z is given as follows.
Z = (mh + (1  )m

p)
1
 (6)
wheremh is the labor input into certain core activities (say headquarter services) which have to remain within the
home country and mp is the labor input for production activities which can potentially be o¤shored. Parameter
 captures the headquarter intensity and  = 11  is the elasticity of substitution between headquarter services
and production services.
If we denote the total amount of labor employed by a rm by N; then we have
N = mh +mp (7)
8 In the case of an extra utility, "ji > 0; while in the case of an extra disutility, "
j
i < 0:
9As a simplifying assumption, one can assume full obsolescence or depreciation of ones human capital or skills each period.
In order to work or search each period in a particular sector, an individual has to incur costs each period to acquire the updated
sector-specic human capital. These costs can be assumed to be individual- and sector-specic.
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To produce either X or Z, a rm needs to open job vacancies and hire workers. The cost of vacancy in terms
of the numeraire good is ci in sector i = x; z.10 Let Li be the total number of workers who look for a job in sector
i: Dene i = viui as the measure of market tightness in sector i; where viLi is the total number of vacancies
in sector i and uiLi is the number of unemployed workers searching for jobs in sector i. The probability of
a vacancy lled is q(i) =
m(vi;ui)
vi
where m(vi; ui) is a constant returns to scale matching function11 . Since
m(vi; ui) is constant returns to scale, q0(i) < 0: The probability of an unemployed worker nding a job is
m(vi;ui)
ui
= iq(i) which is increasing in i: Any job in either sector can be hit with an idiosyncratic shock with
probability  and be destroyed.
2.3 Determination of Unemployment
Denoting the rate of unemployment in sector-i by ui; in steady-state the ow into unemployment must equal
the ow out of unemployment:
(1  ui) = iq(i)ui; i = x; z
The above implies
ui =

 + iq(i)
; i = x; z (8)
The above is the standard Beveridge curve in Pissarides type search models where the rate of unemployment
is positively related to the probability of job destruction, ; and negatively related to the degree of market
tightness i:
2.4 Firms optimization problem
We solve the rms problem in two stages. In the rst stage, employment and the number of vacancies are
chosen, correctly anticipating the wages denoted by wi. Then given the employment levels chosen in the rst
stage, the wage rate for each worker is determined by a process of bilateral Nash bargaining with the rm
separately.12
10The robustness of our results to alternatively dening and xing vacancy costs in terms of good Z or in terms of labor is
discussed in the penultimate section of this paper.
11Our framework, that (as seen later) nests di¤erent degrees of intersectoral labor mobility, requires search by a potential worker
to be directed towards one sector at a time. The number of workers that want to be part of the labor force of each sector (will work
or search in that sector) will be determined in equilibrium. However, restricting to perfect intersectoral labor mobility (no mobility
costs), the assumption regarding search can be altered to general search by each worker across the two sectors simultaneously. Since
wages and market tightness in the case of identical search parameters are equalized across the two sectors even under directed search,
it is easy to see in such a case that, with general search, our results regarding the impact of o¤shoring on aggregate unemployment
and wages will be unchanged. If vacancy costs are di¤erent across sectors, then with general search (unied labor market), workers
in the two sectors will get di¤erent wages and the bargaining problem will be somewhat more complicated.
12Allowing for intra-rm wage bargaining, along the lines of Stole and Zweibel (1996), with the possibility of employment choice
in stage 1 a¤ecting wages in stage 2, results in a solution for wage and employment that is equivalent to the one where the rm in
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Denote the number of vacancies posted by a rm in the Z sector by V: Assuming that each rm is large
enough to employ and hire enough workers to resolve the uncertainty of job inows and outows, the dynamics
of employment for a rm is
:
N(t) = q(z(t))V (t)  N(t) (9)
Therefore, the prot maximization problem for an individual rm can be written as
Max
V (s);mh(s);mp(s)
Z 1
t
e r(s t) fPz(s)Z(s)  wz(s)N(s)  czV (s)g ds (10)
The rm maximizes (10) subject to (6), (7), and (9). We provide details of the rms maximization exercise
in the appendix. Since we are going to study only the steady state in this paper, we suppress the time index
hereafter. From the rst-order conditions of the rms maximization problem, the optimal mix of headquarter
and production labor is given by
mh
mp
=


1  

(11)
which in turn makes the output e¤ectively linear in the total employment of the rm as follows:
Z =  0N ; where  0  [ + (1  )] 1 1 (12)
The key equation from the rms optimal choice of vacancy, derived in the appendix, is given by
 0Pz   wz
(r + )
=
cz
q(z)
(13)
The expression on the left-hand side is the marginal benet from creating a job which equals the present value
of the stream of the value of marginal product net of wage of an extra worker after factoring in the probability
of job separation each period. The expression on the right-hand side is the cost of creating a job which equals
the cost of posting a vacancy, cz; multiplied by the average duration of a vacancy, 1q(z) . The left hand side of
(13) is also the asset value of an extra job for a rm which will be useful in the wage determination below. An
alternative way to write (13) is
 0Pz = wz +
(r + )cz
q(z)
(14)
That is, the value of marginal product of a worker is equal to the marginal cost of hiring a worker (wage plus the
annuitized value of recruitment cost). This is the modied pricing equation in the presence of search frictions
where in addition to the standard wage cost, expected search cost is added to compute the marginal cost of
hiring a worker. This equation is also known as the job creation condition in the literature.
Since the X sector uses one unit of labor to produce one unit of output, the marginal revenue product of
labor in the X sector simply equals Px, and therefore, the prot maximization by rms in the X sector yields
the following analogue of (14)
Px = wx +
(r + )cx
q(x)
(15)
stage 1 takes wage as given (at the perfectly foreseen level that will obtain in stage 2). This is due to the constancy of marginal
product of labor that obtains in our set up. See Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) for a formal proof.
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2.5 Wage Determination
Wage is determined for each worker through a process of Nash bargaining with his/her employer. Workers
bargain individually and simultaneously with the rm. Rotemberg (2006) justies this assumption by viewing
it as a situation where each worker bargains with a separate representative of the rm. Thus each worker and
the representative that he bargains with assume at the time of bargaining that the rm will reach a set of
agreements with the other workers that leads these to remain employed.
Denoting the unemployment benet in terms of the nal good by b, it is shown in the appendix that the
expression for wage is the same as in a standard Pissarides model and is given by
wi = b+
ci
1   [i +
r + 
q(i)
]; i = x; z (16)
where  represents the bargaining power (weight) of the worker relative to the employer (See appendix). The
above wage equation along with (8) and (14) derived earlier are the three key equations determining wz; z;
and uz for a given Pz: For the X sector, the three key equations are (8), (15), and (16).
For each of the two sectors, for a given price we can determine the wage, wi and the market tightness, i
as follows. Equation (16) represents the wage curve, WC which is clearly upward sloping in the (w; ) space in
Figure 1. The greater is the labor market tightness, the higher is the wage that emerges out of the bargaining
process (as the greater is going to be the value of each occupied job). Note that the position of this curve is
independent of the price, Pi: The job creation curve, JC; depicting (14) for sector Z and (15) for sector X; is
downward sloping in the (w; ) space. The recruitment cost, ciq(i) ; is increasing in market tightness, i: The
tighter the market the longer it takes to ll up a vacancy. Therefore, for a given value of the marginal product
of labor, there is a tradeo¤ between the wage and the market tightness. The intersection of WC and JC gives
the partial equilibrium levels of wi and i for a given Pi. As the price, Pi; increases, JC shifts up, leading to
an increase in wi and i; and thus from the Beveridge curve a reduction in unemployment.
2.6 Sectoral choice of workers
Since unemployed workers can search in either sector, they search in the sector where their expected utility is
higher. As shown in equation (38) in the appendix, the asset value of unemployed worker-j searching in sector-i
is given by rU ji = "
j
i + b +

1  cii: Recall that "
j
i is the per-period utility for worker-j from being a¢ liated
with sector-i; while the market tightness variable i positively a¤ects the wage and job nding rate in sector-i:
Since 'j  "jz   "jx; the sectoral choice of workers is given as follows.
If 'j  
1   (cxx   czz) then search in sector-Z
If 'j <

1   (cxx   czz) then search in sector-X
9
Given the above relationship, the equilibrium sectoral choice is determined by a cuto¤ value of ' denoted by b'
where b'(x; z) = 
1   (cxx   czz) (17)
such that a fraction 1   G(b') of workers are a¢ liated with sector Z, while the remaining fraction G(b') are
a¢ liated with sector X. That is,
Lz = (1 G(b'))L;Lx = G(b')L (18)
In the case of perfect mobility ('j = 0 for all j); all workers must be indi¤erent between the two sectors, which
would imply the following no arbitrage condition
cxx = czz (19)
Having specied the building blocks of the model, we next derive the relative supply curve in order to solve for
autarky equilibrium.
2.7 The relative supply curve (under autarky)
In order to derive the relative supply corresponding to each relative price p = PzPx obtain the values of Pz and
Px from (3) which is the zero prot condition (ZPC) for the numeraire good, C: Next, for these values of Pi
determine wi and i from the intersection of WC and JC for sector i as shown in Figure 1. Having determined
i, nd the corresponding b' from (17). Denote b' as a function of p in the case of autarky by b'A(p): Using (12)
and (18), the relative supply of Z can be written as
Z
X
s
=
 0(1  uz)Lz
(1  ux)Lx
=
 0(1  uz)
(1  ux) exp(b'A(p)=) (20)
where ui which is a decreasing function of i is given by (8). To see what happens to the relative supply when
p increases, note from (3) that our choice of numeraire implies an increase in p leads to an increase in Pz and
a decrease in Px. This also implies an increase in z and a decrease in x; which in turn implies a decrease in
uz and an increase in ux: As well, note from (17) that there is a decrease in b'. Therefore, db'A(p)dp < 0; which is
shown in gure 2a: What it says is that more people search for jobs in sector Z as Pz goes up: Therefore, the
relative supply of Z is increasing in its relative price p: We depict this relative supply curve in Figure 2b.
Recall that b'A depicted in Figure 2a is solely a function of p and independent of : Therefore; relative
supply is increasing in  when b'A > 0 and decreasing in  when b'A < 0: At b'A = 0; it is clear from (20) that
relative supply becomes independent of : Denote the solution to b'A(p) = 0 by pA: It is easy to see that the
relative supply curves given by (20) for di¤erent values of  all pass through the same point at p = pA. This is
shown in Figure 2b (in which and in all subsequent gures, we normalize the unemployment benet, b to zero
for simplicity). For p < pA; we have b'A > 0; and hence the relative supply curve for higher  lies to the right
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of the one for lower , while for p > pA; the relative supply curve for higher  lies to the left of the one for
lower . Thus, as  goes down, the relative supply curve rotates clockwise around p = pA (Figure 2b). Clearly
around that point, labor mobility goes up with a decrease in , i.e., at that point any given price shock leads
to a bigger movement in labor from one sector to another, the smaller is : In the limit, when  ! 0; 'j ! 0
8j: In this case the relative supply is zero for any p < pA because no one wants to work in the Z sector, and
it becomes horizontal at p = pA since all workers are indi¤erent between working in the two sectors: This is
the case of perfect labor mobility. The relative supply curves with 2 di¤erent degrees of mobility 1 and 2
(2 > 1 > 0) are shown in Figure 2b and denoted by RS(1; A) and RS(2; A); respectively. The perfect
mobility horizontal relative supply curve is denoted by and RSp(A):
2.8 Equilibrium under autarky
Having derived the relative supply curve, the autarky equilibrium can be determined by bringing in the relative
demand curve given in (4) which is downward sloping. The intersection of the relative demand curve with the
relative supply curve determines the autarky equilibrium. Note that in the case of perfect labor mobility, since
the relative supply curve is horizontal at p = pA where pA solves b'A(p) = 0, the autarky equilibrium price
is necessarily pA: At pA the no arbitrage condition (19) is satised, and therefore, all workers are indi¤erent
between being in the two sectors (since 'j = 0 for all workers).
Autarky equilibrium price with imperfect mobility can be higher or lower than pA depending on the position
of the relative demand curve. To facilitate comparison of the autarky equilibrium with the o¤shoring equilibrium
in the presence of various degrees of labor mobility, we will assume that the technology that yields C in terms
of Z and X is such that the relative demand curve, RD; passes through the common point of intersection of
the autarky relative supply curves with varying degree of intersectoral labor mobility (Figure 2b). That is, the
relative demand is such that the autarky equilibrium price for various degrees of labor mobility is pA: Denote
the corresponding values of other endogenous variables of interest by PAz ; P
A
x ; w
A
z ; w
A
x ; 
A
z ; 
A
x ; u
A
z ; u
A
x :
3 O¤shoring
Now, suppose rms in the Z sector have the option of procuring input mp from abroad (which we call o¤shoring
in this paper) instead of producing them domestically.13 The per unit cost of o¤shored input is ws in terms of
the numeraire good C, and this country takes this per unit cost as given:14 This includes transportation cost,
13The assumption here is that one unit of home (domestic) labor can produce one unit of the production input. Therefore, we
use mp to denote both the number of units of the imported input in the o¤shoring case as well as the number of units of production
labor in the autarky case.
14The assumption that ws is xed is e¤ectively a small country assumption. However, as argued in an earlier version of this
paper, there is no loss of generality resulting from it. Large amounts of labor used in the production of a numeraire consumption
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tari¤s, foreign wage costs and possible search costs, all of which, for analytical tractability, we assume to be
proportional to the amount of the input o¤shored. If and when o¤shoring takes place, the nal good C will be
exported to pay for the imports of mp:
We use the following notational simplication in the rest of the paper.
Denition 1: fwz  wz + (r+)czq(z) ;!  fwzws
In the above denition fwz is the total cost of hiring a labor in the Z sector which includes wage and the
recruitment cost. ! is the cost of of a unit of domestic labor in the Z sector relative to the cost of an o¤shored
production input. In an o¤shoring equilibrium it must be the case that !  1: Starting from an autarky
equilibrium with relative price pA and associated cost of employing a worker in sector Z given by fwzA; it must
be the case that ws < fwzA; so that o¤shoring the production input is cheaper than producing it domestically.
We assume this to be the case in the analysis of o¤shoring and state it explicitly in the assumption below.
Assumption 1: Cost of o¤shoring input, ws; is less than the autarky equilibrium labor cost in sector Z,fwzA:
3.1 O¤shoring rms problem
For a rm o¤shoring its production input, the production function specied in (6) can be written as Z =
(N + (1   )mp)
1
 , where N is the domestic labor used for headquarter services. An o¤shoring rms rst
stage problem is given by
Max
V (s);N(s);mp(s)
Z 1
t
e r(s t)fPz(s)Z(s)  wz(s)N(s)  wsmp(s)  czV (s)gds
Again, the rm anticipates the wage correctly while choosing its employment and the quantity of o¤shored
production input. 15
Using the notation in denition 1, the ratio in which an o¤shoring rm uses headquarter and production
inputs in steady state is given by
N
mp
=


(1  )!

(21)
good in the South (country to which input production is o¤shored), which forms a large share in the household budget, xes wage
and the unemployment rate also in input production there. One can here easily work out the implications of o¤shoring for the
South.
15 If rms can freely adjust the amount of o¤shored input, mp even after the wage-bargaining stage, then ws must equal the value
of marginal product of o¤shored input. Given the CRS production function this also pins down the value of marginal product
of headquarter workers, and hence the solution for wage and employment is equivalent to the one where the rm takes the wage
as given in stage 1 as shown by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). This is important to note since we are e¤ectively assuming that the
quantity of the o¤shored input is freely adjustable by rms.
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From the rst order conditions of an o¤shoring rms optimization problem we get
Pz =

 (fwz)1  + (1  )w1 s  11  (22)
The expression on the right hands side above is the marginal cost of producing a unit of Z.
Since in steady-state the value of a headquarter job in the Z sector must still equal the recruitment cost,
cz
q(z)
, the Nash bargained wage is still given by
wz = b+
cz
1   [z +
r + 
q(z)
] (23)
Also, as a result, the asset value of unemployed worker-j searching in sector-i is still given by rU ji =
"ji + b+

1  cii; and therefore, the equilibrium sectoral choice is determined by a cuto¤ value of ' denoted byb' dened in (17) earlier, which we recall is
b'(x; z) = 
1   (cxx   czz) (24)
3.2 Productivity E¤ect of O¤shoring
Before deriving the o¤shoring relative supply curve which allows us to derive o¤shoring equilibrium, we identify
the productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring as follows. Rewrite (22) as 
 + (1  )! 1
 1
 1 Pz = fwz (25)
The left hand side is the value of marginal product of domestic labor in headquarter activity, which must
equal the cost of hiring domestic labor inclusive of the recruitment cost. This is the job creation condition for
headquarter jobs for o¤shoring rms. At ! = 1 the expression above reduces to the job creation condition (14)
derived in autarky. Note that at the autarky equilibrium price PAz and the autarky equilibrium labor cost,fwzA; in the Z sector the l.h.s of (25) exceeds the r.h.s because fwzA > ws by assumption. That is, the value of
marginal product of a headquarter worker exceeds its hiring cost (wage plus the annuitized value of recruitment
cost), which would lead to more job creation in headquarter activity by o¤shoring rms. This increase in the
value of marginal product of headquarter labor in the Z sector is the productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring. Now,
if Pz was unchanged at the autarky level, as would be the case in a one sector model, then to satisfy the
job creation condition (25), fwz must increase which implies from (23) a higher wz and z as well. We can
show this diagrammatically in Figure 1. For each Pz; the JC 0 curve representing (25) lies to the right of the
JC curve representing (14) because fwz satisfying (25) is higher than the fwz satisfying (14). Since the wage
bargaining curve remains unchanged, wz and z are higher in the o¤shoring case. A higher z implies a lower
unemployment as well. That is, the productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring by itself creates greater job creation and
lower unemployment. This gives rise to the lemma below.
Lemma 1: Holding product prices constant, o¤shoring implies an increase in z and a decrease in uz:
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Below we will see that in our two sector model, the productivity e¤ect can be o¤set by the relative price
e¤ect, the strength of which depends on the extent of intersectoral mobility of labor and the elasticities of
substitution in production and consumption.
3.3 O¤shoring relative-supply curve
To derive the o¤shoring equilibrium, we rst derive the o¤shoring relative supply at each relative product price
p as follows. For any p if the labor cost in the Z sector in the absence of o¤shoring, fwz; is below the cost of
o¤shored input ws then there is no o¤shoring. Since in the absence of o¤shoring fwz is monotonically increasing
in p; for any ws; there exists a p(ws) such that for p < p(ws); fwz < ws; and hence in this case the relative
supply with the possibility of o¤shoring coincides with the autarky relative supply curve. At p = p(ws); fwz
exactly equals ws: Denote the price of good Z corresponding to p(ws) by Pz(ws)From (14) it is clear that if
Pz = Pz(ws) =
ws
 0 ; then fwz = ws; that is, at p = p(ws); rms are indi¤erent between o¤shoring the production
input and sourcing it domestically. Therefore, at p = p(ws) there is a horizontal segment in the o¤shore relative
supply curve with no rms o¤shoring determining the left boundary of the horizontal segment and all rms
o¤shoring determining its right boundary.
For p > p(ws), fwz in the absence of o¤shoring exceeds ws, therefore, all rms o¤shore. It can be easily
veried that due to the productivity e¤ect discussed earlier, o¤shoring relative supply curve lies to the right of
the autarky relative supply curve in this range. In the appendix we formally prove the following lemma on the
shift in relative supply in the case of imperfect mobility of labor.
Lemma 2: There is a step shift in the o¤shoring relative supply curve compared to autarky. For p < p(ws)
the o¤shoring supply curve corresponds to the autarky supply curve. For p = p(ws); the o¤shoring supply curve
has a horizontal segment and for p > p(ws); the o¤shoring supply curve lies to the right of the autarky supply
curve.
The o¤shoring relative supply curve in the case of perfect labor mobility can be obtained as the limiting
case of o¤shoring relative supply curve with imperfect mobility when  ! 0 ( is the variance parameter of
the distribution of '): Denote the cuto¤ b' as a function of p with the possibility of o¤shoring by b'o(p): The
following lemma is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 3: The o¤shoring relative supply curve in the case of perfect labor mobility is horizontal at po where
po 2 (p(ws); pA) is the solution to b'o(p) = 0:
Note that since po is the solution to b'o(p) = 0; at po; cxx = czz; and hence all workers are indi¤erent
between the two sectors as is required in the case of perfect mobility.
Figure 3 depicts the positions of the o¤shoring relative supply curves for 1 and 2 such that 2 > 1;
and for the the perfect mobility case. They are denoted by RS(1; O); RS(2; O); and RSp(O); respectively.
Analogous to autarky, o¤shoring relative supply curves with various degrees of labor mobility all pass through
14
the same point at p = po: It is worth pointing out that while the horizontal relative supply in the case of perfect
labor mobility arises due to the indi¤erence of workers between the two sectors, the horizontal segment in the
case of imperfect mobility arises due to the indi¤erence of rms in the Z sector between o¤shoring and domestic
sourcing of production input.
Having derived the o¤shoring relative supply curve, we are ready to discuss the possible o¤shoring equilibria
in the model.
3.4 O¤shoring equilibrium
Given the o¤shoring relative supply curve described in lemma 2 above, there are two possible types of o¤shoring
equilibria in the imperfect mobility case.
1) Complete O¤shoring Equilibrium. If the relative demand curve intersects the o¤shoring relative supply
curve on the right-hand rising part, then we get a complete o¤shoring equilibrium with all rms o¤shoring.
Figure 3 shows complete o¤shoring equilibria for two di¤erent values of ; 1 and 2: The o¤shoring equilibrium
prices are po(1) and po(2); respectively.
2) Mixed O¤shoring Equilibrium. If the relative demand curve intersects the horizontal part of the o¤shoring
relative supply curve, then we get a mixed equilibrium where only some rms in the industry o¤shore and others
remain fully domestic. This equilibrium is shown in Figure 4. In this case the equilibrium price is necessarily
equal to p(ws):
From lemma 3 it is clear that there cannot be a mixed equilibrium in the case of perfect labor mobility
since po > p(ws). Therefore, we get a complete o¤shoring in this case, which is depicted in Figure 3, where the
equilibrium price is po:
4 Impact of o¤shoring on the domestic labor market
In an o¤shoring equilibrium- with perfect and imperfect mobility of labor- the relative price of Z is lower than
in autarky: This is the relative price e¤ectof o¤shoring mentioned in the introduction. An increase in the
relative price of Z also implies an increase in the price of Z; Pz; in terms of the nal consumption good and a
decrease in the price of X; Px, in terms of the nal consumption good. Below we discuss the implications of
o¤shoring for sectoral labor markets.
4.1 Impact on sectoral unemployment and wages in sector X
An increase in Px increases job creation in the X sector because the recruitment cost that needs to be paid is
xed in terms of the numeraire good. In terms of Figure 1, there is a rightward shift in the JC curve in the
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X sector, while the WC curve remains unchanged. Therefore, wx and x increase relative to autarky while ux
decreases.
4.2 Impact on sectoral unemployment and wages in sector Z
The impact of o¤shoring on unemployment in the Z sector depends on two opposing forces. The productivity
e¤ect discussed earlier increases job creation in the headquarter activities in the Z sector, and thereby leads to
lower unemployment. The relative price e¤ect, by lowering the price of good Z in terms of the numeraire good
reduces job creation in the Z sector and hence increases unemployment. The net e¤ect depends on the relative
strengths of these opposing forces. In terms of Figure 1, the positive productivity e¤ect shifts the JC curve to
the right for a given Pz, however, a decline in Pz (the relative price e¤ect) shifts it to the left. The net shift in
the JC curve is ambiguous in general, however, we obtain unambiguous results in the following two cases: 1)
perfect mobility of labor; and 2) mixed equilibrium with imperfect mobility of labor
If labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, the result that x increases implies from the no arbitrage condition
(19) that z must increase as well. That is, the positive productivity e¤ect must dominate the negative relative
price e¤ect, and hence there must be an increase in the wage and a decrease in unemployment in the Z sector.
In terms of Figure 1, the productivity e¤ect takes the JC curve to the right to JC 0 and the price e¤ect shifts
it back in the other direction to JC" but not all the way back up to JC.
In the case of imperfect labor mobility, when there is a mixed equilibrium, the equilibrium price is p(ws) < pA:
The o¤shoring equilibrium domestic labor cost in the Z sector, fwz; corresponding to p = p(ws); equals ws, which
by assumption 1 above is less than fwzA: Therefore, both wz and z decrease relative to autarky, and hence the
unemployment rate is higher in the Z sector. Looking at the job creation condition, (25), note that ! = 1 in
the case of mixed equilibrium; and hence a reduction in Pz leads to a denite decrease in the value of marginal
product of labor in the Z sector and consequently a decline in Z-sector wage and an increase in Z-sector
unemployment. That is, the negative relative price e¤ect more than o¤sets the positive productivity e¤ect in
the case of mixed equilibrium.
Finally, in the case of complete o¤shoring equilibrium with imperfectly mobile labor, the impact of o¤shoring
on unemployment and wage in the Z sector is ambiguous. The results are summarized below.
Proposition 1 A) In the case of perfect labor mobility only a complete o¤shoring equilibrium is possible, and
sectoral wages are unambiguously higher and sectoral unemployment rates unambiguously lower in an o¤shoring
equilibrium compared to the autarky equilibrium.
(B) In the case of imperfect labor mobility
(i) the unemployment rate in the non-o¤shoring sector goes down and the wage rate goes up, relative to what
we obtain in the autarky equilibrium,
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(ii) in the o¤shoring sector, (a) the unemployment rate goes up and the wage rate goes down in a mixed o¤shoring
equilibrium, but (b) the impact is ambiguous in a complete o¤shoring equilibrium.
Even though the impact of o¤shoring on unemployment in the o¤shoring sector is ambiguous in a complete
o¤shoring equilibrium with imperfect mobility of labor, we can get some additional insights by comparing it
with the equilibrium obtained in the perfect mobility case. Denoting the endogenous variables in an o¤shoring
equilibrium with superscript o; using a continuity argument, we derive the following corollary for the imperfect
mobility case.
Corollary 1: For any ws < fwzA; there exists an (ws) such that for  < (ws), woz > wAz and oz > Az :
The Corollary above implies that with a su¢ cient degree of labor mobility, the sectoral unemployment rates
decrease in both sectors. More generally, since the productivity e¤ect dominates the relative price e¤ect in the
perfect mobility case, the same happens in the imperfect mobility case as long as the negative relative price
e¤ect is weaker than in the perfect mobility case, i.e., whenever the equilibrium relative price under o¤shoring
with imperfect labor mobility is higher than po: On the other hand, if the o¤shoring equilibrium relative price
with imperfect mobility is lower than po; then the negative relative price e¤ect is stronger than in the case of
perfect labor mobility, and hence the impact of o¤shoring on unemployment in the Z sector is ambiguous. This
latter case is depicted in Figure 3. We can see that o¤shoring leads to a bigger fall in p under imperfect labor
mobility than under perfect mobility.
Whether the relative price e¤ect in the imperfect labor mobility case is weaker or stronger than in the perfect
mobility case is tied to the issue of direction of intersectoral labor movement as a consequence of o¤shoring,
which in turn depends on the fundamental parameters of the models such as the elasticities of substitution in
production and consumption as is discussed in detail below. Intuitively speaking, if the parameters are such that
labor is required to move out of the o¤shoring sector and into the non-o¤shoring sector in the perfect mobility
case, then fewer people will move from the Z sector to the X sector in the imperfect mobility case, leading to
a greater decline in the relative price of good Z: In this case, the negative relative price e¤ect is stronger with
imperfect mobility of labor. In the reverse case the negative relative price e¤ect would be weaker with imperfect
mobility of labor.
4.3 Determinants of the direction of intersectoral movement of labor
Providing analytical results on the movement of labor consequent upon o¤shoring is not feasible in the case
of imperfect mobility, however, in the case of perfect mobility the no arbitrage condition allows us to derive
analytical results which we provide below. Assume a constant elasticity of substitution production function for
C where the elasticity of substitution is : Recall that the elasticity of substitution between headquarter and
production labor in Z production is : We prove the following lemma in the appendix for the perfect mobility
case.
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Lemma 4: When cx = cz, except when  > 1 and  < 1; labor moves from the Z sector to the X sector
as a result of o¤shoring. When  > 1 and  < 1; it is possible for labor to move from the X sector to the Z
sector as a result of o¤shoring.
Intuitively, since production jobs are lost in the Z sector, while there is greater job creation in the X sector,
workers are likely to move from Z sector to the X sector. As well, cheaper o¤shored production input can be
substituted for more expensive domestic headquarter labor leading to further movement of workers to the X
sector. Countering these e¤ects is the increase in the relative demand for good Z resulting from a decrease in
its relative price. The latter e¤ect on the derived demand for labor is normally dominated by the former e¤ects.
However, if the elasticity of substitution between X and Z in the production of the consumption good C is very
high ( > 1) and the elasticity of substitution between headquarter and production labor in the production of
Z is relatively low ( < 1), then workers could move from the X sector to Z sector upon o¤shoring. A high 
implies a large increase in the relative quantity of Z demanded for a small decrease in the relative price of Z:
A low  implies fewer headquarter jobs can be substituted by cheaper production jobs. Therefore, with  > 1
and  < 1 workers may end up moving to the Z sector.16 While lemma 4 discusses labor movement for all
possible values of  and ; it is reasonable to think that the elasticity of substitution between headquarter and
production input is less than 1. In that case we can say that labor moves from Z to X if   1 and may move
from X to Z if  > 1:
Even though the analytical result in Lemma 4 obtains for cx = cz; using a continuity argument we claim that
it will hold if cx and cz are not too di¤erent. Numerical simulations conrm that the result on Lz decreasing
upon o¤shoring is valid even when cx 6= cz (cx and cz are fairly far apart) except in the case of very high  and
very low . Also, the same parameters determine the direction of labor movement in the imperfect mobility
case.
4.4 Impact of o¤shoring on aggregate unemployment
While we have derived results on the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral unemployment rates, the economywide
unemployment rate is a weighted average of the sectoral unemployment rates with the weights being the share
of each sector in the total labor force. Now, even if the sectoral unemployment rates go down, economywide
16With perfect intersectoral labor mobility, it is worth noting that if we get rid of all the labor market frictions in this model and
the labor market is made perfectly competitive, the labor force allocation across the two sectors will be exactly the same as in the
case of cx = cx in our labor-market search model (with perfect intersectoral labor mobility). That is, in the absence of frictions
in the labor market, o¤shoring will lead to movement of workers from sector Z to sector X except when  > 1 and  < 1: This
can be easily veried in the proof of labor allocation in the appendix. Since there will be full employment when search frictions
are absent, there will be no change in unemployment as a result of o¤shoring. The wage increase and the sectoral unemployment
reduction that we get upon o¤shoring in the presence of search frictions will, in the absence of these frictions, be translated into
just a wage increase.
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unemployment rate may increase if workers move from low unemployment sector to high unemployment sector.
Alternatively, even if the unemployment rate in the Z sector increases upon o¤shoring (as happens in a mixed
equilibrium), economywide unemployment rate may go down if workers move to the low unemployment sector
upon o¤shoring. Since the impact of o¤shoring on the unemployment rate in the Z sector is ambiguous with
imperfect labor mobility, the impact on the aggregate unemployment rate is ambiguous as well. In the case of
perfect mobility, we can get some clear cut results depending on the sectoral search costs, which are discussed
below.
Case I: In the special case of cx = cz, no arbitrage condition (19) implies x = z and hence ux = uz: Since
o¤shoring reduces sectoral unemployment rates, the aggregate unemployment rate must fall as well.
When cx 6= cz; we have x 6= z, and therefore, the two sectors have di¤erent unemployment rates. Now,
the impact of o¤shoring on economywide unemployment also depends on the direction of labor movement, that
is whether labor moves to the high unemployment sector or low unemployment sector, which in turn depend on
parameters as described in lemma 4 above. To avoid discussing too many cases, we discuss the results in the
more plausible case of  < 1.
Case II: cx < cz: In this case, no arbitrage condition (19) implies x > z, and hence ux < uz: For   1
labor moves from Z sector to X sector, and hence there is an unambiguous decrease in aggregate unemployment.
In the case of  > 1 labor may move from X to Z, in which case the impact on aggregate unemployment would
be ambiguous.
Case III: cx > cz: For   1 labor moves from Z sector to X sector, and hence the impact on aggregate
unemployment is ambiguous. If  > 1; then labor may move from X to Z, in which case there would be an
unambiguous decrease in aggregate unemployment.
The result on aggregate unemployment is summarized in a proposition below.
Proposition 2 (A) In the case of imperfect mobility of labor, the impact of o¤shoring on aggregate unemploy-
ment rate is ambiguous.
(B) With perfect mobility, however,
(i) there is a decrease in aggregate unemployment if labor moves from the high unemployment sector to the low
unemployment sector. (When vacancy costs are higher in sector Z than in X, this happens when the elasticity
of substitution between Z and X in yielding C is not high relative to the elasticity of substitution between head-
quarter and production inputs in Z production.)
(ii) the impact is ambiguous if labor moves from the low unemployment sector to the high unemployment sector.
(When vacancy costs are higher in Z, this can happen when the elasticity of substitution in C is relatively high.)
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5 Possible Extensions and Discussion
While we have discussed o¤shoring in a model with perfect or imperfect intersectoral mobility of labor, there
was perfect intra-sectoral mobility of labor. Below we discuss how the results would change with alternative
descriptions of intra and intersectoral labor mobility.
5.1 A model with skilled and unskilled labor
Suppose there is no labor mobility across the two types of jobs in the Z sector but there is mobility of production
labor between the two sectors, i.e., headquarter jobs require skilled workers, while production jobs require
unskilled or relatively less skilled workers who can also work in the X sector. After o¤shoring, the production
input cost in sector Z equals ws; and all the domestic production labor moves to sectorX. Holding product prices
constant at the autarky level, the value of marginal product of headquarter labor rises due to the productivity
e¤ect discussed earlier. Thus, upon o¤shoring, at autarky product prices, unemployment falls for skilled workers
who work in the headquarter activities in the Z sector, while it remains unchanged in sectorX. More headquarter
labor is employed as a result in sector Z. In addition, at autarky prices; since the ratio of production input to
headquarter labor has gone up, employment of production input (now all o¤shored) and therefore the output
of Z have also gone up. Holding product prices at the autarky level, the X-sector labor force actually increases
upon o¤shoring since all the domestic production labor from Z actually ows into X. Thus, both the outputs
of X and Z go up at autarky product prices and as a result, the impact on relative supply Z=X is ambiguous
(depends on parameters, including ws). These parameters will determine how much production labor is released
from the Z sector to go to the X sector upon o¤shoring and how large the increase is in the marginal product of
headquarter labor. Thus; the o¤shoring equilibrium relative price of Z could be higher or lower than in autarky.
If the relative price of Z is lower in the o¤shoring equilibrium, then this negative price e¤ect counteracts
the positive productivity e¤ect, rendering the impact of o¤shoring on the unemployment of headquarter labor
ambiguous. An increase in the price of X in this case implies a reduction in the unemployment of production
labor all of which is absorbed in the X sector labor force. If the parameters are such that the relative price of
Z increases upon o¤shoring, then headquarter unemployment goes down and production labor unemployment
goes up.17
The general result for within-sector immobility of labor across job types (i.e, with two types of labor)
discussed above in this subsection is that upon o¤shoring, unemployment cannot rise at the same time for both
types of labor, but can fall for both. At least, one type of labor will experience a fall in its unemployment
rate. While in the main part of the paper, we have worked out the consequences of imperfect intersectoral
17 It is important to note that in the case of the positive price e¤ect, a mixed equilibrium is possible, where simultaneously some
amount of domestic production labor is used in the Z sector and some amount of o¤shoring takes place. (The derivation of results
in this subsection can be obtained from the authors upon request.)
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mobility, in this section we explored the implications of within sector immobility. If we had both intersectoral
immobility and within-sector immobility across job types in the same model, it is easy to see in that case that
unemployment of production workers in the Z sector would go up as a result of o¤shoring for the following
reason: These workers would have to compete with the cheap input coming from abroad, while they would have
no alternative domestic employment opportunities.
5.2 Alternative ways of modeling vacancy costs
We next focus on the modeling of vacancy cost in this paper. We have modeled vacancy cost, c; in terms of
the numeraire good which seemed natural given the two sector structure of the model. One could alternatively
model the vacancy cost either in terms of labor or foregone output. In the former case, the vacancy cost would
be ciwi for sector i = X;Z; where wi is the sectoral wage. In the latter case, it would be cipi:We nd that, under
fairly plausible and reasonable conditions, the qualitative results would be unchanged. The key to obtaining
our result on unemployment is that productivity changes should not be fully absorbed by wage changes, which
will obtain with alternative specications of search costs as well.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, in order to study the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral and economywide rates of unemployment,
we construct a two-sector general-equilibrium model in which unemployment is caused by search frictions.
Our model incorporates imperfections in labor mobility across sectors. Perfect labor mobility is a special case
of our framework. For this case, we nd that, contrary to general perception, wage increases and sectoral
unemployment decreases due to o¤shoring when labor is intersectorally perfectly mobile. This result can be
understood to arise from the dominance of the productivity enhancing (cost reducing) e¤ect of o¤shoring over
its negative relative price e¤ect on the o¤shoring sector. This result is consistent with the recent empirical
results of Amiti and Wei (2005a, b) for the US and UK, where, when sectors are dened broadly enough, they
nd no evidence of a negative e¤ect of o¤shoring on sectoral employment.
When parameters are such that they result in substantial impediments to intersectoral labor mobility, the
negative relative price e¤ect mentioned above can dominate the positive productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring, and
unemployment can increase (and wage can decrease) in the sector which is subject to o¤shoring. This happens
when the substitution elasticity between the two intermediate goods in the production of the nal consumption
good is small relative to the substitution elasticity between o¤shorable and non-o¤shorable inputs within the
o¤shoring sector. In the other (intermediate good) sector, o¤shoring has a stronger unemployment reducing
e¤ect in the absence of perfect intersectoral labor mobility. With imperfect labor mobility, there is also the
possibility of a mixed equilibrium (incomplete o¤shoring). When a mixed o¤shoring equilibrium emerges, we
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know for sure that unemployment has gone up in the o¤shoring sector relative to autarky.
There is also a parameter conguration which could lead to a smaller negative price e¤ect on the o¤shoring
sector under imperfect labor mobility, and therefore sectoral unemployment unambiguously goes down in that
case due to o¤shoring.
The above are results pertaining to sectoral unemployment. While it is di¢ cult to characterize the e¤ects
of o¤shoring on aggregate or overall unemployment, it is possible to some extent to derive results on aggregate
unemployment for the special case of perfect labor mobility. In this case, even though both sectors have
lower unemployment post-o¤shoring, there is an additional determinant of the overall unemployment rate.
It is whether the sector with the lower unemployment or higher unemployment expands. If the search cost is
identical in the two sectors, this additional factor obviously goes away, implying identical rates of unemployment
across sectors, in which case the economywide rate of unemployment declines unambiguously after o¤shoring.
Alternatively, even if the search cost is higher in the sector which experiences o¤shoring (implying a higher
wage as well as higher rate of unemployment in that sector), the economywide rate of unemployment most
likely decreases because, under the relatively more plausible parameter congurations, workers move from the
higher unemployment sector to the lower unemployment sector. This means that, in this case, the additional
sectoral composition factor works in the same direction as the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral unemployment.
We have two main messages. Firstly, how o¤shoring will a¤ect unemployment will depend on the alternative
opportunities available for workers with o¤shored jobs. If these workers can freely start searching for alternative
jobs in the same or another sector, we see a reduction in the unemployment rates for all types of workers.
Secondly, with imperfect mobility (across sectors and/or across jobs), unemployment for some workers can go
up with o¤shoring. However, unemployment rates for all types of workers is unlikely to go up at the same time.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Maximization problem of the rm in the autarky case
The rm maximizes (10) subject to (9), and (7). Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (9) by ,
and with (7) by ; the current value Hamiltonian for each rm can be written as
H = PzZ   wzN   czV + [q(z)V   N ] + [N  mh  mp]
where Z is given in (6). The rst order conditions for the above maximization are follows.
mh : Pzm
 1
h (m

h + (1  )m

p)
1
 1 =  (26)
mp : Pz(1  )m 1p (m

h + (1  )m

p)
1
 1 =  (27)
V : cz = q(z) (28)
N : wz +     =
:
  r (29)
Now, (26) and (27) imply
mh
mp
=


1  
 1
1 
(30)
using the above in (26) gives
 0Pz =  (31)
Since the value of marginal product of labor, given by  0Pz; is constant, using the result from Cahuc and
Wasmer (2001) mentioned in footnote 11, we have treated wage to be exogenous in deriving (29) above.
Next, note from (28) that for a given z,  is constant. Using
:
 = 0; (28), and (31) in (29) we get
 0PZ   wz = (r + ) =
(r + )cz
q(z)
(32)
 is the shadow value of an extra job.
7.2 Wage Determination
Let U jz denote the income of the unemployed worker-j searching for a job in the Z sector. The asset value
equation for the unemployed in this sector is given by
rU jz = "
j
z + b+ zq(z)[E
j
z   U jz ] (33)
where Ejz is the expected income from becoming employed in the Z sector, which is the sum of the idiosyncratic
benet, "jz; the unemployment benet b; and the expected capital gain from the possible change in state from
unemployed to employed:
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The asset value equation for employed worker-j in sector Z is given by
rEjz = "
j
z + w
j
z + (U
j
z   Ejz)) Ejz =
"jz
r + 
+
wjz
r + 
+
U jz
r + 
(34)
Again the return on being employed is the sum of the idiosyncratic benet, "jz; the wage, and the expected
change in the asset value from a change in state from employed to unemployed. Next, (34) implies that
Ejz   U jz =
"jz
r + 
+
wjz
r + 
  rU
j
z
r + 
(35)
Assume the rent from a vacant job to be zero which is ensured by no barriers to the posting of vacancy. Now,
denote the surplus for a rm from a job occupied by worker-j by Jjz . From (32) above,
Jjz =
 0Pz   wjz
(r + )
(36)
The Nash-bargained wage is obtained by
argmax
wjz
 
Ejz   U jz
  
Jjz
1 
where Ejz   U jz is given in (35) and Jjz is given by (36). The rst-order condition for the bargained wage is
Ejz   U jz =

1   J
j
z =

1  
cz
q(z)
(37)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the value of an occupied job, Jjz ; equals
cz
q(z)
as discussed in
(13) in the text. Plugging the value of Ejz  U jz from above into the asset value equation for the unemployed in
(33) we have a simplied version of this asset value equation
rU jz = "
j
z + b+

1   czz (38)
Use (37) to substitute out Ejz   U jz and (38) to substitute out rU jz in (35) to get the following simplied wage
equation:
wjz = b+
cz
1   [z +
r + 
q(z)
]
Note that wjz is the same for all j:Similarly, in the case of the X sector, we obtain wx = b+
cx
1  [x +
r+
q(x)
]:
7.3 Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3
At p = p(ws) the relative supply of Z is given by
( + (1  ))
1
 1 [Lz(1  uz) No] +   ( + (1  ))

 1 No
Lx(1  ux)
(39)
where the total domestic employment of the o¤shoring rms is denoted by No and No 2 [0; Lz(1   uz)], and
Lx and Lz are given in (18). Since b' is a function of p; Lz and Lx are functions of p as well. Therefore, the
denominator remains constant while the numerator increases with No:
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To nd the o¤shoring relative supply when p > p(ws), we need to obtain the amount of labor a¢ liated with
each sector, which in turn depends on b' given in (24). Denote the b' with the possibility of o¤shoring by b'o(p);
where the superscript o stands for o¤shoring, and as in autarky, b' is a function of p. For p < p(ws), allowing for
o¤shoring leaves b'(p) unchanged. For p > p(ws); Pz and Px are still given by (3). Therefore, x and wx remain
unchanged from autarky for each p. However, z and wz are now determined by (25). We know from lemma 1
that z and wz are higher than in autarky. Since z is higher while x is unchanged for each p > p(ws); (24)
implies that the b'o(p) curve lies to the left of the b'A(p) curve as is shown in Figure 2a.
Note that the expressions for the amount of labor going to each sector in the case of o¤shoring are still given
by (18) with b'A being replaced by b'o: The relative supply for each p > p(ws) is given by
Z
X
s
=
 
 
 + (1  )! 1
 
 1 (1  uz)
(1  ux) exp(b'o(p)=) (40)
where ui , !; and b'o are functions of p: For each p > p(ws); ! > 1; b'o(p) < b'A(p); ux is unchanged from
autarky, while uz is lower than in autarky, therefore, the expression on the r.h.s above exceeds the expression
on the r.h.s of (20). This proves lemma 2.
In the limit, when  ! 0; 'j ! 0 8j: In this case the relative supply is zero for any p < po because
cxx > czz; and hence no one wants to work in the Z sector, and it becomes horizontal at p = po since all
workers are indi¤erent between working in the two sectors: Also, b'o(p) < b'A(p) implies po < pA: Next we prove
that po > p(ws): Note that, there is no o¤shoring for p < p(ws): Therefore, po  p(ws): Suppose po = p(ws):
Now, by assumption ws < fwzA; which leads to o¤shoring (Recall that the superscripts o and A denote
the equilibrium values of variables under o¤shoring and autarky, respectively). At p = p(ws) we have fwzo =
ws < fwzA. This implies, from the wage curve equation for Z; that oz < Az : Additionally, fwzo < fwzA in
conjunction with the numeraire condition (or the zero-prot condition for the numeraire good C) implies thatfwxo > fwxA, which in turn from the wage curve equation for X; gives us ox > Ax : By the no arbitrage condition,
we start in autarky from a situation where Az = 
A
x : Given that 
o
z < 
A
z and 
o
x > 
A
x ; this implies 
o
z < 
o
x:
Thus the no arbitrage condition is not satised under o¤shoring. This is a contradiction because at po the no
arbitrage condition must be satised by denition. Therefore, po > p(ws): This proves lemma 3.
The expression in (40) makes it clear that the relative supply is independent of  for b'o(p) = 0: Therefore,
the o¤shoring relative supply curves with di¤erent values of  all pass through the same point at p = po: Using
the same argument as in the case of autarky, we can verify that a decrease in  leads to a clockwise rotation
of the relative supply curve at p = po: This pins down the relative positions of the o¤shoring relative supply
curves corresponding to 1 and 2; respectively, in Figure 3.
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7.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Assume cx = cz and the following production function for C
C =

Z
 1
 + (1  )X
 1

 
 1
where  is the elasticity of substitution between X and Z: The production function for C implies the following
cost function.

 (Pz)
1 
+ (1  ) (Px)1 
 1
1 
(41)
Since C is the numeraire, the unit cost of C must equal 1: Note that the relative demand (4) for Z when the
production function for C is of the CES type is given by
Z
X
d
=

Px
(1  )Pz

(42)
The relative demand for Z equal to relative supply in autarky equilibrium can be written as
 0Lz
L  LAz
=

Px
(1  )Pz

(1  ux)
(1  uz)
(43)
Next, cx = cz implies x = z, which in turn implies wx = wz; and hence Px =  0Pz where  0  [ +
(1  )] 1 1 : Also, x = z implies ux = uz. Therefore, from (43)
LAz
L  LAz
=
1
 0

 0
(1  )

(44)
where LAz is the amount of labor in the Z sector in autarky equilibrium. Note that if there was no labor market
friction in the model, the expression for Lz in autarky would be exactly the same as in (44).
Similarly, the relative demand equals relative supply in the o¤shoring equilibrium can be written as
 
 
 + (1  )! 1
 
 1 Lz
L  Lz
=

Px
(1  )Pz

(1  ux)
(1  uz)
(45)
Again, cx = cz implies x = z and hence ux = uz:Also, x = z and wx = wz imply Px =
 
 + (1  )! 1
 1
 1 Pz.
Therefore, (45) can be written as
Loz
L  Loz
=

( + (1  )! 1)

 1
0@   + (1  )! 1 1 1
(1  )
1A (46)
where Loz is the amount of labor in the Z sector in the o¤shoring equilibrium. Again, if there is no labor market
friction then the expression for Lz in an o¤shoring equilibrium would be the same as in (46). The only di¤erence
would be that ! would be the ratio of domestic wage to foreign wage rather than being the ratio of domestic
labor cost to foreign wage.
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Comparing (44) and (46) note that LAz > (<)L
o
z if the following inequality holds.
 + (1  )
 + (1  )! 1
 1
 1
> (<)

 + (1  )! 1 (47)
We get the following possibilities:
Case I:  = 1: In this case the l.h.s of (47) exceeds the r.h.s if 

+(1 )! 1 < 1; if which is true for any :
Therefore, if the production function for C is Cobb-Douglas, then irrespective of the elasticity of substitution
in Z production, labor always moves from Z to X upon o¤shoring.
Case II:  = : In this case the l.h.s of (47) exceeds the r.h.s if 1+
 
1 


> 1, which is always true implying
LAz > L
o
z:
Case III:  < 1;  > 1: In this case the l.h.s of exceeds 1 since 
+(1 )
+(1 )! 1 < 1 and
 1
 1 < 0; while the
r.h.s is less than 1. Therefore, again LAz > L
o
z:
Case IV:  < 1;  < 1: Again, the l.h.s of (47) exceeds 1 because 
+(1 )
+(1 )! 1 > 1 and
 1
 1 > 0: Therefore,
again LAz > L
o
z:
Case V:  > 1;  > 1: Again, the l.h.s of (47) exceeds 1 because 
+(1 )
+(1 )! 1 > 1 and
 1
 1 > 0: Therefore,
again LAz > L
o
z:
Case VI:  > 1;  < 1. In this case  < 1 implies 
+(1 )
+(1 )! 1 > 1;but  > 1;  < 1 implies
 1
 1 < 0:
Therefore, the l.h.s of (47) is less than 1. Since both the l.h.s and the r.h.s are less than 1, it is possible for the
r.h.s to exceed l.h.s in which case LAz < L
o
z:
29
JC”
JC’
JC
WCw
θ
Figure 1: Partial Equilibrium
φ(p)
p
Figure 2a: Equilibrium Prices Figure 2b: Autarky Equilibrium
Z/X
p
pA
RSP(A)
RD
RS(α1; A)
RS(α2; A)
A
α1 < α2
0
pAp
op
φA(p)φo(p)
Figure 3: Complete Offshoring Equilibrium
p
pA
RSP(A)
RD
RS(α1; A)
RS(α2; A)
A
α1 < α2
RS(α1; O)
RSP(O)
RS(α2; O)
po
Z/X
p(ws)
po(α1)
po(α2)
p
pA
RD
A
RSP(A)
Figure 4: Mixed Offshoring Equilibrium
p(ws)
Z/X
RS(α; A)
RS(α; O)
